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DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING:
PROBLEMATIC OR PRAGMATIC?
In the Supreme Court’s landmark decision, Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, the Court ruled that corporate funding of independent
political broadcasts in candidate elections could not be limited.1 In response to
this decision, reformers have called for the implementation of rules that would
require public companies to seek approval from shareholders, or, at the very
least, disclose to shareholders all corporate political contributions.2 Despite
several proposals at both the federal3 and state4 level, there is currently no law
that requires disclosure of corporate political spending to shareholders.5
Though debates about corporate political spending often devolve into political
fights over the reach of the First Amendment, the importance of shareholder
access to information and increasing popular opinion suggest that corporations
should publicly disclose their political contributions to their shareholders.
Corporations, on the other hand, have put forward counterarguments for
maintaining the status quo.
As of now, the push for total shareholder disclosure or approval of
corporate political spending is embodied in the Shareholder Protection Act
(SPA), a proposed federal act that aims to amend the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.6 In §14C(b)(1) of the “act,” it requires “each solicitation of proxy,
consent or authorization by an issuer with a class of equity securities” contain
“a description of the specific nature of any expenditure for political activities
proposed” and the “total amount of expenditures for political activities
proposed to be made by the issuer for the forthcoming fiscal year.”7 Further,
§14C(c)(2) would require a vote of the majority of the outstanding
shareholders to make expenditures for political activities.8 According to
1

See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
CENTER
FOR
POLITICAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=d/sp/i/870/pid/870/pid/190 (last visited February 8, 2014).
3 See Govtrack.us, Shareholder Protection Act of 2013, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s824
(last visited November 1, 2013).
4 See, e.g., 2011 Me. Laws House Paper 1120, 2013 N.Y. Laws Senate Bill 2952, 2013 Pa. Laws House
Bill 462, 2013 W.V. Acts House Bill 3098.
5 Center for Political Accountability, supra note 2.
6 See Shareholder Protection Act of 2013, S.B. 824, 113th Cong. (2013).
7 See id.
8 See id.
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§14C(e), “each institutional investment manager shall disclose . . . at least
annually . . . how it voted on any shareholder vote.”9 If it does so, §14C(f)
provides a safe harbor against civil, criminal, or administrative actions.10
According to the author Sen. Robert Menendez from New Jersey, the SPA
would “give shareholders a voice over how their corporate dollars are spent on
elections.”11
The demand for shareholder disclosure of corporate political spending is
high and continues to grow. A rulemaking petition filed with the S.E.C. by a
coalition of law professors seeking public disclosure of such payments has
received over 380,000 letters of support.12 The petition also received more than
600,000 comments, the most comments received on a petition or rule in the
agency’s history.13 Moreover, an analysis by Institutional Shareholder Services
found that the number of shareholder proposals demanding more transparency
has been steadily rising, increasing from eighty-eight in 2011 to 126 in 2013.14
In 2012, investors representing more than $300 billion in assets under
management signed an open letter to S&P 500 companies asking them to
disclose their political spending.15 Supporters of disclosure note that in the
2012 federal elections alone, more than $1 billion was spent by outside groups
with minimal disclosure.16
Proponents of the SPA argue that corporate governance is more effective
when shareholders have access to all pertinent information regarding their
investments. A lack of disclosure is risky for investors. Shareholders and
potential shareholders need to know about risky corporate business behaviors
9

See id.
Id.
11 Press Release, Rep. Michael Capuano, Rep. Capuano and Sen. Mendez Reintroduce Shareholder
Protection Act (April 25, 2013), http://www.house.gov/capuano/news/2013/pr042513.shtml.
12 See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Shareholders Need Robust Disclosure to Exercise Their Voting
Rights as Investors and Owners, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1365171492322#P66_20759.
13 See N. Y. Times Editorial Board, Keeping Shareholders in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/opinion/keeping-shareholders-in-the-dark.html.
14 See Dina ElBoghdady, Some public companies are divulging more details about their political
contributions,
THE
WASH.
POST,
(Sept.
24,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/companies-beefing-up-their-political-spendingdisclosures/2013/09/24/3531a21c-252b-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html.
15 See Letter from Ian Vandwalker, Counsel, Democracy Program, Brennan Center for Justice at New
York University School of Law, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y Securities and Exchange Comm (Aug. 19,
2013),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/brennan-center-submits-comments-sec-corporate-politicalspending-requirement.
16 See Press Release, Rep. Michael Capuano, supra note 11.
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in order to make well-informed investment decisions.17 Without disclosure,
“shareholders have no way to assess whether corporate political spending
benefits them, and have every reason to believe it is fraught with risks to the
corporate brand, business reputation, the bottom and, by extension, shareholder
returns.”18 Disclosure ensures that corporate money that is donated to
candidates, issues and activities aligns with the company’s publicly stated
values, policies, and practices.19 Demonstrating greater disclosure and
accountability can help corporations build public trust and investor
confidence.20
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that politically connected, yet
secretive firms have lower value, show worse financial performance, and are
more likely to need government bailouts.21 One study examined almost a
thousand S&P 1500 firms for ten years and found a negative correlation
between political spending and both market and accounting performance.22
William S. Laufer, a professor at the Wharton School and director of its
Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research found that “corporate political
disclosure and accountability . . . [are] powerful proxies of good governance
and . . . competitive advantage.”23 Some of America’s most successful
companies, including Qualcomm, United Parcel Service, Conoco Phillips and
JPMorgan Chase have joined the ranks of firms with the best corporate
disclosure policies.24 In fact, the Center for Political Accountability (CPA)
found that 78 percent of the 195 corporations it tracks have improved their
political spending disclosures in 2013 compared with 2012.25
The SPA is not without critics, and one of the most outspoken opponents is
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. According to Thomas Quaadman, vice
president of the Chamber’s Center for Capital Markets, “[t]his bill dangerously
exposes corporate directors to outside influencers and could put companies at

17

See Letter from Ian Vandwalker to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 15
New York Times Editorial Board, supra note 4.
19 See CENTER FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 2
20 See Id.
21 See Letter from Ian Vandwalker to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 15..
22 See Id.
23 Ctr. for Political Accountability, New CPA-Zicklin Index Reveals Surge in Number of Top Companies
with Strong Political Disclosure Policies, CENTER FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, (last accessed Feb. 10,
2014), http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=d/sp/i/8051/pid/8051.
24 See Id.
25 See Dina ElBoghdady, supra note 14.
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the mercy of special interests.”26 Currently, corporate directors have a
fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporations.27 Thus, when
special interests, such as political interests, interfere with directors’ decisions,
the best interests of the corporation can be jeopardized. Typically, corporate
directors are “best equipped and able to make the complex day-to-day
decisions,” so they should not be hampered by “constant and unwarranted
second-guessing from outside forces.”28 Overall, the Chamber believes the
SPA would leave the United States as at a competitive disadvantage in the
worldwide business arena, because corporate directors from most countries are
not burdened by shareholder disclosure or approval requirements.29
Critics of the SPA believe that the bill unduly impinges upon directorial
discretion, and they believe that the business judgment rule is a sufficient
check on a director’s decision making.30 These critics argue that the business
judgment rule gives directors the latitude to make good faith, disinterested
decisions that are in the best interest of the corporation.31 Thus, expanding
shareholder disclosure or approval powers would lead to a “great deal of
inefficient and counterproductive interference in corporate decision-making by
shareholders and other interest groups.”32 Such inefficiencies include the
second-guessing and micromanagement of business directors’ decisions.33
In addition, there may be a very reasonable disconnect between what one
believes in and what one supports for financial reasons. Corporate political
speech does not suppress or prevent the individual expression of political
speech.34 For example, if a shareholder invests in a corporation that supports a
Republican candidate for financial reasons, that shareholder is not restricted
26 Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Expresses Strong Opposition to
Shareholder Protection Act, (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2010/july/us-chamberexpresses-strong-opposition-shareholder-protection-act.
27 See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Corporate Litigation, SIMPSON THATCHER & BARTLETT LLP,
http://www.stblaw.com/google_file.cfm?TrackedFile=4B46116601DFEBD896B179&TrackedFolder=585C1
D235281AED996A07D5F9F9478AB5A90188899 (citing MacKenzie-Childs, LLC v. MacKenzie-Childs, 262
F.R.D. 241, 249 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)).
28 Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 26.
29 See id.
30 See David A. Katz, Limitations on Contributions Would Undercut Directors, HARVARD L. SCHOOL
FORUM
ON
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
&
FIN.
REGULATION
(Nov.
8,
2011),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/08/11/limitations-on-contributions-would-undercut-directors/.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See Roger Coffin, A Responsibility to Speak: Citizens United, Corporate Governance and Managing
Risks, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 103, 150 (2012).
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from supporting Democratic candidates for political reasons. It would take a
“leap of faith” to believe that the corporation’s political position could
rationally be attributed to the shareholder simply because of a financially
motivated investment.35
Finally, corporate directors have fiduciary responsibilities to the
corporation and its shareholders with regard to numerous corporate decisions
outside the scope of political spending. If the duties of care, loyalty, and good
faith are sufficient to prevent a director from ignoring these responsibilities in
other contexts, they should be sufficient in the context of political spending.36
Professor Roger Coffin of the University of Delaware found that the market’s
perception of value (seen through stock prices) is unrelated to a firm’s decision
to either engage in or refrain from corporate political speech.37 Therefore,
Citizens United and corporate political speech may be nonfactors in financial
markets.38
Undoubtedly, until Congress or the SEC takes a firm stance on shareholder
disclosure of corporate political spending, this debate will continue. There are
many compelling empirical and normative reasons to implement corporate
political disclosure policies. On the other hand, perhaps we should leave it to a
company’s board and its directors to promote the well-being of the corporation
and make their own decisions. Regardless of which side prevails, hopefully the
decision is made with the focus on sound corporate governance and economic
principles, and not on the political powers who have caused this debate in the
first place.
STEVEN ZUCKERMAN∗
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